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The Will to Reform: Public Opinion and the 1832 Reform Bill 
Safwan Shabab, 2010 
 
A news piece run by The Times 
on April 30, 1831 reported the sighting 
of two rooks – a pair of ‘aristocratic’ 
birds – at Wood-street in London, at just 
about the time when Lord John Russell 
presented the first Reform Bill to the 
House of Commons. The newspaper 
speculated that this appearance was an 
omen for the choice that lay in front of 
the British aristocracy of the time – 
whether they have “nothing to fear from 
citizens if the Bill passed…or if 
gentlemen will find it highly 
advantageous to obtain superior articles 
(popular support) at fair prices?”1 This 
report, in a light hearted manner, 
underscored the brewing tensions in 
Britain over popular calls to reform the 
corrupt and aristocratic representative 
system of the 1830s. British public 
opinion was affecting national politics in 
an unprecedented manner. Spurred on by 
a vibrant press, the public seemed 
determined to influence politicians by 
manifesting their concerns and 
expectations. People “devoured the daily 
paper to read on the progress of the 
reform bill and watch the representatives 
they sent to Parliament to express their 
feelings.”2 In this paper, I will argue that 
public opinion in Britain during the 
1830s was the most crucial factor in 
ensuring the passage of Great Reform 
                                                
1 Advertisement, “A surprising fact,” The 
Times, April 30, 1831, 4.  
2 News, “The Reform Bill,” The Times, 
September 26, 1831, 3. 
Act of 1832. I intend to validate this 
claim by contending that the alteration in 
relationship between the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords, the 
split within the Tories, the Whig 
response and King William IV’s role 
were direct outcomes of the popular 
agitation in Britain between 1831 and 
1832. Alternative impetus for reform, 
including an inherent parliamentary 
dynamism and competence of British 
politicians and monarch will be also 
shown to be inadequate, in the absence 
of a public will, to explain the passage of 
the Reform.   
This paper uses The Times, a 
traditionally conservative leading British 
daily established in 1785 as the primary 
source for defending its thesis. A series 
of 20 articles, including reports 
parliamentary proceedings, public 
meetings, commentaries by individual 
readers and editorial pieces, between 
March 1831 and June 1835 provide 
insight into the changing public mood as 
the Reform Bill was debated in the 
Parliament. With rapid improvement in 
newspaper printing by the 1820s, The 
Times was read by a large number of 
Britons, including middle class urbanites, 
mercantile groups and Church officials 
and often closely reflected popular 
views.3 In an editorial published on 
                                                
    3 This spectrum of readers is seen in the 
letters received by The Times from businessmen 
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August 16, 1831, The Times claimed 
that, in light of the public spirit, it 
supported the Reform Bill “not because 
it was the bill of Ministers, but as being 
a bill for reform”. Although it stated that 
its support for Whig Prime Minister 
Lord Grey was contingent upon his 
pursuit of reforms, this comment 
exposes the strong bias of the newspaper 
towards the Bill and its proponents. 
While this bias is consistently present in 
the publications, The Times still manages 
to provide comprehensive accounts of 
developments during the period. The 
surprising fact that The Times, despite 
its conservative leaning, endorsed the 
Reform Bill actually allows for the study 
of a stronger case for reform as the daily 
presented its coverage of the 1832 
Reform Bill. 
            The bill, formally known as An 
Act to Amend the Representation of the 
People in England and Wales, sought to 
restructure the existing electoral system 
by redistributing seats and extending 
enfranchisement to the public. First 
presented on March 1, 1831 soon after 
the election of a Whig government under 
Lord Grey, the bill failed twice to pass 
through the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords. The repeated rejection 
of the reforms fuelled public agitation, 
resulting in violent unrest in Derby and 
other places. The Times, echoing popular 
sentiments, did not hesitate to shift the 
blame for these riots on the “obstinacy 
of the Lords” who were acting to 
preserve “every political and moral 
                                                                 
, clergymen and local politicians in response to 
news and editorials run by the daily, see Michael 
Brock, The Great Reform Act  (London: 
Hutchinson, 1973), 17. 
degradation” of the political status quo. 4 
Amidst a national crisis after the Duke of 
Wellington failed to form a government, 
King William IV finally gave royal assent 
to the bill on June 7, 1832. The Times, 
welcoming the news of the passage, 
printed clauses from the Act; it read "Be 
it enacted that all male persons of full 
age, seized of and in any lands or 
tenements of at least the yearly value of 
10l, shall have a right to vote in the 
elections in all future parliament."5  
Provisions such as these effectively 
increased the franchise by lowering the 
property threshold and included 217,000 
new voters to expand the electorate to 
650,000.6 Of equal importance was the 
effort to do away with rotten and pocket 
boroughs which had bred corruption in 
the electoral process.7 The Bill instead 
allowed for representation of larger 
population centers such as Manchester, 
Birmingham and Leeds. Both these 
measures were responding to popular 
demands for a reduction in the influence 
of aristocrats in the Parliament and to 
accommodate a burgeoning British 
middle class. When Lord Russell defined 
the objective of the Grey government 
was to “(pass a measure which) every 
reasonable man in the country should be 
                                                
    4 News, “Rejection of the Reform Bill,” The 
Times, Oct 11, 1831, 4. 
    5 Politics and Government, “Parliamentary 
Reform Bill,” The Times, Mar 16, 1831, 5.  
    6 John A. Phillips and Charles Wetherell, 
“The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political 
Modernization of England,” The American 
Historical Review 100, No.2 (1995): 412 
    7 Rotten boroughs were constituencies which 
had a very small population but were still 
returning members to Parliament, while pocket 
boroughs were constituencies which were under 
direct patronage of the British aristocrats.  
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satisfied with”, he was arguably playing 
to these very public sentiments. 8 
                     Primary sources reveal that 
the British public was acting in an 
unprecedented manner to alter the 
relationship between the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords. At 
its roots, such popular agitation was 
influenced by a heightened sense of 
expectation in a reformed Parliament, as 
reported in The Times. 9 Speakers at a 
pro-reform county meeting in Essex 
argued that an unreformed House 
prevented the people from having the 
“object of their choice” and 
compromised a “just estimate of public 
rights.”10 The public right in question 
was the entitlement of British citizens to 
be represented by parliamentarians who 
could protect constituent interests 
against unpopular legislations, such as 
the Corn Laws and the 1829 Catholic 
Relief Act. 11   The problem, as perceived 
by the public, was that the House of 
Commons was entirely controlled by the 
peers in the House of Lords, rendering it 
unresponsive to popular concerns. The 
Times reminded its readers that “the 
House of Commons is said to be the 
people’s house”.12 The legitimacy of any 
                                                
    8 Editorial, The Times, Feb 20, 1837, 4.  
    9 The Quarterly Review, Reform – A Political 
and Social Movement (February, 1831), reprinted 
in The Great Reform Bill of 1832 : Liberal or 
Conservative? (Lexington, D.C. Heath, 1969),  
38-39 
    10 Editorial, The Times, March 17, 1831, 2. 
    11 The Corn Laws imposed tariff on grain 
import, raising food prices for the general public 
while allowing for business owners to earn large 
profits. Similarly, the Catholic Relief Act was 
unpopular for removing restrictions on 
opportunities for Catholics such as the holding of 
public offices. 
    12 Editorial, The Times, April 21, 1831, 5. 
government, whether under the Duke of 
Wellington or Lord Grey, depended on 
the support of the people. What is 
remarkable about this time period in 
British politics is the strong belief that 
the House of Commons should serve the 
people – the time had come when “no 
House of Common dare defy popular 
opinion.”13 The public was increasingly 
less receptive to the idea of a House of 
Commons as mere political instruments 
of the House of Lords.  On the other 
hand, the House of Lords was blamed to 
be dangerously defying calls for 
extending franchise and eliminating 
corruption. An editorial, echoing the calls 
in pro-reform county meetings across the 
country, argued that the peerage in the 
House was failing to realize that “their 
own greatness is dependent on the 
general welfare and happiness of the 
people.”14 By spending exorbitant 
amounts to send handpicked members to 
the Commons and thereby ‘pocketing’ 
constituencies, the Lords were 
effectively preventing “honorable men of 
moderate fortune” to run for public 
office and thereby rendering the Lower 
House of Parliament dysfunctional.15  
The common expectation was that “with 
a reformed Parliament, (such) abuses will 
die a natural death”.16 Thus, it is clear the 
public actively anticipated and advocated 
against these abuses, which were a 
                                                
   13 Editorial, The Times, May 31, 1848, 5. 
   14 Editorial, The Times, July 08, 1831, 4. 
   15 Editorial, The Times, March 17, 1831, 2. 
   16 This heightened expectation sheds light not 
only into the motivations behind violent riots 
that broke out every time the Reform Bill was 
rejected by the Parliament, but also explains the 
alliances of disparate interest groups which were 
driving the Reform movement, see Editorial, 
The Times, March 28, 1831, 2. 
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product of the working relationship 
between the Houses of Parliament. With 
the House of Lords controlling the 
actions of the House of Commons, it is 
improbable that any other cause, such as 
an inherent dynamism in the 
parliamentary structure of the 1830s 
could have pushed for this change in the 
institutional setup.  Alternatively, this 
alteration could have been attributed as a 
conscious move by the Lords to 
compromise with members in the House 
of Commons and hence, consolidate their 
position against popular opinion. 
However, this explanation does not lend 
itself to an independent cause of the 
change in parliamentary setup – the 
Lords actions were arguably were still a 
reaction to the ominous public agitation. 
Hence public pressure to revive the 
House of Commons as a popular 
institution, and not leave it as a pawn of 
the peers, was critical to introduce the 
Reform Bill in 1831.  
              The political split within the 
Tories was heavily influenced by the 
way in which the party handled public 
opinion during the early 1830s. In a 
speech to the House of Commons in 
1830, Tory Prime Minister Duke of 
Wellington had asserted to the House of 
Commons that the system of 
representation in the status quo was 
sufficiently representative and possessed 
the nation’s confidence; he deemed it as 
his duty to oppose all reforms.17 A 
reading of the Duke of Wellington’s 
biography shows that he held that the 
“people are rotten to the core” and thus 
                                                
    17 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington-A 
Personal History (London: Harper Collins, 
1997), 282. 
was opposed to allow ordinary middle 
class Britons a voice in Parliament.18 The 
Duke’s arrogance marked a certain 
disconnect of the ruling Tories from the 
prevailing public mood outside 
Westminster. Similarly, readings from 
traditional Tory periodicals show that 
pro-Wellington Tories dismissed the 
popular calls for reform as an 
‘evanescent, periodical excitement’ and 
any measures toward reform as a futile 
attempt to reach a political utopia. 19 
The public received the Tory 
indifference to calls for reform 
negatively; a satirical prose in The Times 
mocking the Duke and his ministers 
summed up the popular perception of 
the Prime Minister, “Because / I scorn 
the people, and deny their claims/The 
Bill is therefore bad! / The Bill is 
therefore bad!”20 A section of the Duke’s 
Ministry, the ultra-Tories who had 
realized that their conservative interests 
could only be protected through a 
compromise and not by the Duke’s 
contempt of the public, decided to split 
and support the Reform Bill in April 
1830. Shortly thereafter, the Wellington 
government collapsed and new elections 
were announced; pressures of public 
opinion evidently caused the divide 
within the ruling party. It may be 
contended that this Tory split was a 
                                                
    18 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington-A 
Personal History (London: Harper Collins, 
1997), 296. 
    19 The Quarterly Review, Reform – A 
Political and Social Movement (February, 1831), 
reprinted in The Great Reform Bill of 1832: 
Liberal or Conservative? (Lexington, D.C. 
Heath, 1969), 34. 
    20  Arts and Entertainment, “Poetical Protest 
of the Duke of Wellington Agaisnt the Second 
Reading of the Reform Bill,” The Times, April 
19, 1832, 2.  
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result of well intentioned desires by 
certain Tory Ministers to make 
Parliament more representative, and was 
not necessarily a product of public 
pressure. However, an examination of 
reports in The Times suggests 
differently. An ultra-Tory leader in Bury 
stated that he did not necessarily 
“approve of (reform), but admitted that 
it was the absolute necessity,” referring 
to the public indignation over rejection of 
the Bill.21 This Tory faction still 
strongly advocated for ‘closed 
boroughs’, believed that it was an 
inherent right of the aristocracy to 
dominate Parliament and thus insisted 
that the interests of the ‘landed classes’ 
must be protected.22 However, these 
politicians realized that without reform, 
the only option left was a popular and 
almost inevitable ruining of their 
privileges had they not acquiesced to 
public demands. Hence, what is seen 
here is that the split amongst the Tories 
was a direct outcome of public agitation 
and not a result of any political desire to 
reform the electoral system.  
             In contrast to its Tory 
predecessors, the Whig government 
safely positioned themselves as the 
proponents of reform. In the ensuing 
debates after the Bill was first placed, 
the Whig Prime Minister Lord Grey 
made clear his intention to pass the 
reforms, adding that “I will stand or fall 
with the bill.”23  Lord John Russell had 
                                                
      21 News, The Times, March 25, 1831, 4. 
      22 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
Reform and the Role of Interest (February, 
1831), reprinted in The Great Reform Bill of 
1832: Liberal or Conservative? (Lexington, 
D.C. Heath, 1969), 52. 
      23 News, The Times, April 25, 1832, 3. 
already promised the nation ‘every 
reasonable man’ would gain from the 
Reform Bill, hinting that it would cater 
to the demands of the middle class which 
was advocating for reform.24 A reading 
from a pro-Whig journal reveals that the 
government was working to ensure that 
“all sections of people would be merged 
into one (political system)” and that no 
section will be endowed with separate 
political privileges.25 Importantly, the 
Whig government was simultaneously 
making attempts to secure the support 
of local political unions to consolidate its 
power at a time of turbulent popular 
movements. Civil society groups, such 
as the Birmingham Political Union, 
represented alliances between disparate 
interest groups such as anti-slavery 
activists, free trade proponents, business 
guilds as well as ordinary workers; The 
Times called it the “barometer of the 
Reform feeling throughout England.” 26 
The Whigs viewed an alliance with these 
groups as crucial for its survival in office, 
especially after the Tory government 
collapsed for ignoring public opinion. 
The Times reported on a series of 
meetings between Lord John Russell and 
Mr. Gregson, leader of the Birmingham 
Political Union, over the inclusion of a 
clause to prevent artificial tenantry.27 
                                                
      24  Ellis A. Wasson, “The Spirit of Reform, 
1832 and 1867,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal 
Concerned with British Studies 12, no.2(1980): 
164. 
       25 The Westminster Review, A Means to an 
End (July, 1831), reprinted in The Great Reform 
Bill of 1832: Liberal or Conservative? 
(Lexington, D.C. Heath, 1969), 31. 
       26 The Quarterly Review, Reform – A 
Political and Social Movement (February, 1831), 
reprinted in The Great Reform Bill of 1832: 
Liberal or Conservative? (Lexington, D.C. 
Heath, 1969), 41. 
      27 Editorial, The Times, July 05, 1831, 3. 
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Correspondences such as these allowed 
the government, and specifically the 
Prime Minister, to be seen in 
consultation with civil society members 
who were in direct contact with the 
wider public. It is fair to argue here that 
the Whig government’s confidence to call 
for new elections after the House of 
Lords blocked the Reform Bill in late 
1831 was a result of its success in 
securing popular support. Once again, it 
is evident that public opinion not only 
helped Lord Grey and ministers to hold 
on to power during a turbulent first term 
in office, but provided it political capital 
to win a second term and carry the 
Reform Bill using an affirmed mandate.  
A critical response to this argument may 
point to the fact that the Grey 
government might not actually have 
enjoyed such strong popular backing, as 
was portrayed in the pro-reform The 
Times. In fact, many of the Whig-backed 
Reform measures of 1831-32 resulted in 
complicated voter registration processes 
and poorly defined county divisions – 
boroughs like Southwark in Surrey with 
a population of 91,501 people risked 
being disenfranchised.28 However, the 
strong alliances that Grey and his 
ministers had built up with political 
unions allowed the government to 
survive the problems that arose from 
these electoral inconsistencies of the Bill. 
This was evident in the reports of 
celebration, where speakers at public 
gatherings confirmed that “the people 
supported the present Ministry”, 
displaying deference for the Lord Grey 
                                                
   28 Letters to the Editor, “Reform Act, A 
Freeholder of Southwark,” The Times, August 
08, 1832, 3. 
and his government.29 Hence, the Whig 
rule was validated by popular support 
and was provided the impetus with to 
eventually pass the Reform Bill in 1832. 
               An interesting proposition to 
examine in defending the original thesis is 
the role of the monarchy amidst the 
crisis and passage of the 1832 Reform 
Bill. King William IV assumed power 
after the death of King George IV in June 
1830 amidst the constitutional crisis over 
reforms. Despite being new to the 
throne, the king played an influential role 
in initially opposing the Bill before 
finally assenting to the third draft in 
1832 after the Duke of Wellington failed 
to form a government and block Lord 
Grey’s reform agenda.30 Importantly, he 
agreed to employ the Whig plan to create 
new peers in the event that the third 
Reform Bill was rejected and dilute the 
strength of the conservative Lords 
through ‘peer-making’.31 There appears 
to be a contradiction in The Times and 
secondary sources over whether the King 
was supporting reform (and thus being 
responsive to public opinion) from the 
onset of his succession to the throne. 
Reports from a Sussex County meeting 
in April, 1831 showed reformers 
expressing reverence for the monarch, 
claiming the King to be “generous” and 
wishing to “restore the people their just 
                                                
   29 News, “London Almhouse Anniversary 
Celebrate the Passing of the Reform Bill,” The 
Times, June 08, 1835,3. 
   30 John A. Phillips and Charles Wetherell, 
“The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political 
Modernization of England,” The American 
Historical Review 100, No.2 (1995): 413. 
   31 J.R.M. Butler, The Passing of the Great 
Reform Bill (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1914), 333. 
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and undoubted rights.”32 Interestingly, 
this piece appeared at a time when 
secondary sources reveal that the King 
was in fact opposed to any 
parliamentary reform, upon advice from 
the House of Lords. 33 Thus it becomes 
imperative to establish whether public 
opinion had any impact on the King’s 
decision to eventually resolve the crisis. 
In the period between 1830 and mid-
1831, primary sources, such as news 
from the April 1831 County meeting at 
Sussex, depict him as favoring reform – 
and only calls upon the King to create 
new peers.34 The primary sources show 
that none of King’s initial inaction or 
active opposition to reform measures 
created public discontent.  Hence, critics 
may contend that public opinion had 
little to do with the monarch’s decisions, 
including his eventual assent to the 
passing of the Bill. However, it is crucial 
to understand that when William IV did 
decide to use the prospect of ‘peer-
creation’, he was acting reluctantly and 
only in the face of active pressure from 
the Whigs in government. The King had 
asked the Duke of Wellington to form a 
government in mid-1831 as a last 
attempt to hinder the passage of the 
Reform Bill; the attempt failed due to a 
lack of confidence in a new Wellington 
government. Thus the fact that only the 
Whigs commanded significant public 
support must not have been lost on the 
King in 1832.  As the Bill was passed, 
                                                
32 Politics and Government, “Reform Bill, 
Sussex County Meeting,”, The Times, April 09, 
1831, 3. 
33 J.R.M. Butler, The Passing of the Great 
Reform Bill (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1914), 340. 
34 News, “Rejection of the Reform Bill, Riots at 
Derby,”, The Times, Oct 11, 1831, 4. 
The Times claimed that the monarch had 
sought to “to restore to his people those 
rights and liberties of which they have 
been so long deprived” – such deference 
amidst the volatile political environment 
of 1832 was arguably conditional upon 
the King’s willingness to respond to 
popular demands for reform.35 In fact, in 
hindsight, William’s decision to consider 
a redistribution of power within the 
House of Lord and consequently putting 
at risk his own position of authority 
only lends credibility to the sheer impact 
of public opinion which bound the king 
to allow for the reforms. 
              Critics have claimed that the 
Great Reform Act of 1832 may have 
well been the single most influential 
piece of legislation in British politics in 
the 19th century. Any inherent 
dynamism of British political 
institutions, competence of its 
politicians or even the astuteness of the 
monarch could have hardly provided 
such an impetus to ensure the passage of 
the 1832 Reform Bill and to restore the 
House of Commons as a representative 
body. Perhaps, it is not surprising that 
eventually it was public opinion which 
revived the nation’s most influential 
popular institution, the House of 
Commons and affirmed ordinary 
Britons’ stake in national politics in the 
decades following the eventful years of 
1830-32.  
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